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ABSTRACT—Treaties have evolved significantly since the ratification of 
the United States Constitution, leading to uncertainty as to the 
constitutional limits on their domestic execution. This Note adapts existing 
constitutional doctrine on treaty execution to two distinct complications 
arising in the contemporary treaty regime. First, voluntary treaties imposing 
aspirational obligations on signatories raise the issue of the extent of 
obligations that Congress may domestically enforce by federal statute. 
Second, originating treaties which create international organizations and 
authorize them to adopt rule- and adjudication-type post-treaty 
pronouncements bring up a question of when, if ever, to incorporate those 
pronouncements into U.S. law, and at what level of legal precedence. 
Drawing on historical foundations, constitutional case law, and policy 
considerations in light of the evolving treaty regime, this Note proposes 
constitutional tests to address both developments. This Note introduces a 
two-step reasonableness inquiry for statutes executing voluntary treaties, 
based on the reasonableness of the statute in light of (1) the language and 
goals of the treaty, as well as (2) U.S. involvement in the treaty. For post-
treaty pronouncements, this Note suggests that such pronouncements 
should be incorporated into U.S. law if they (1) do not violate a provision 
of the U.S. Constitution and (2) are valid under the originating treaty’s 
procedural and substantive law. Post-treaty pronouncements that pass this 
test should be incorporated at the same level of precedence as federal 
statutes in order to best address concerns regarding the balance between the 
federal government and states’ constitutionally protected powers. The 
complex methodology proposed in this Note provides a necessary 
mechanism for navigating an increasingly complex international legal 
order. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Perhaps one of the most contentious issues of constitutional law is the 
role of treaties.1 Treaties occupy a tenuous position both in the separation 
of powers between the branches of the federal government and in the 
balance between the national and state governments. Under the Supremacy 
Clause of the Constitution, “all Treaties made” are among the categories 
declared “the supreme Law of the Land.”2 Article II furnishes the power to 
enter into treaties in the President, with the advice and consent of the 
1 There is prolific literature on the subject. See, e.g., William M. Carter, Jr., Treaties as Law and 
the Rule of Law: The Judicial Power to Compel Domestic Treaty Implementation, 69 MD. L. REV. 344 
(2010); Oona A. Hathaway et al., The Treaty Power: Its History, Scope, and Limits, 98 CORNELL L. 
REV. 239 (2013); Vincent J. Samar, The Treaty Power and the Supremacy Clause: Rethinking Reid v. 
Covert in a Global Context, 36 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 287 (2010); Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Treaties as 
Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and the Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, 122 HARV. L. REV. 
599 (2008); Steven T. Voigt, The Divergence of Modern Jurisprudence from the Original Intent for 
Federalist and Tenth Amendment Limitations on the Treaty Power, 12 U. N.H. L. REV. 85 (2014). 
2 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
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Senate.3 Finally, the Necessary and Proper Clause of Article I grants 
Congress the power to enact laws in pursuance of those treaties.4 
In the centuries since the Constitution’s ratification, the United States’ 
participation in multilateral treaties and agreements has skyrocketed.5 This 
ever-growing trend—one that shows no signs of stopping—highlights the 
importance of properly setting limits on Congress’s treaty-executing power. 
Under a republican system, treaties are controversial because their writers 
are not always persons accountable to the people of the United States.6 
Indeed, treaties are often written in significant part by officials from other 
countries.7 This lack of direct accountability should require more stringent 
constitutional scrutiny on Congress’s attempts to apply treaties through 
legislation. 
As a starting point, however, it is essential to define what a treaty is 
for the purposes of determining the content of the supreme law of the land. 
Doing so in the contemporary international order is ambiguous in at least 
two ways. First, treaties and agreements are not static creatures. Not only 
may they be amended, but especially when they establish organizations to 
enforce their provisions, they may also generate further pronouncements, 
including international court decisions and international organization 
legislation. While these pronouncements are not themselves the treaties, 
they are made under the procedural and substantive guidelines thereof. 
Examples include resolutions of the United Nations (U.N.),8 judgments of 
3 Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to 
make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur . . . .”).  
4 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 18 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o make all Laws which shall be 
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by 
this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”). It 
is, of course, possible that an act of Congress executing a treaty provision may be directly authorized by 
one of the other enumerated powers in Article I. However, the vast body of case law on treaty execution 
deals with more complicated scenarios which cannot be shoehorned easily into one of those enumerated 
powers.  
5 See generally U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE: A LIST OF TREATIES AND OTHER 
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN FORCE ON JANUARY 1, 2013 (2013 & Supp. 
2015), http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/tif/ [https://perma.cc/B4HP-VZ4M]. 
6 E.g., Voigt, supra note 1, at 85–86. 
7 In many instances, the United States is just one of many countries with a vested interest in the 
scope of the treaty. For example, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty involved balancing interests of 
the United States, its allies in Western Europe, and other countries interested in nuclear weaponry. 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 
[hereinafter NPT]. As Professor Mallard notes, the NPT is thus the product of intersecting, sometimes 
conflicting, interests, with U.S. interests being only one source. See generally GRÉGOIRE MALLARD, 
FALLOUT: NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY IN AN AGE OF GLOBAL FRACTURE (2014). 
8 For example, the Security Council adopts resolutions regarding international peacekeeping and 
security. E.g., S.C. Res. 2178, ¶¶ 11–13 (Sept. 24, 2014) (calling for international cooperation in 
engaging and collecting data on terrorist groups); S.C. Res. 2141 (Mar. 5, 2014) (setting agenda and 
schedules for expert investigations into North Korean nuclear proliferation). The General Assembly 
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the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Dispute Settlement Board (DSB),9 
and the triggering of Article 5 obligations under the North Atlantic 
Treaty.10 Such pronouncements by treaty organizations raise the question of 
how to determine if and when these become part of the law of the land as 
“treaties,” and whether an act of Congress in pursuance of such a 
pronouncement is constitutional.11 Moreover, it is unclear what precedence 
within the hierarchy of laws in the United States these pronouncements 
should take. Should they be equivalent to the originating treaties or should 
they take lower precedence? If they are given lower precedence, how much 
lower than the original treaties should they be? 
A second ambiguity emerges with the increasing proliferation of 
voluntary, rather than mandatory, multilateral agreements among nations. 
Whereas mandatory treaties lay out explicit requirements for signatories, 
voluntary agreements set goals that are either aspirational, indefinite, or 
both.12 One illustrative case is the Kyoto Protocol, which regulates 
signatory nation-states’ carbon emissions through sliding-scale target 
emissions levels and reductions.13 The United States signed but did not 
ratify the Protocol, and thus the Protocol imposes no binding obligations on 
adopts resolutions on a broader spectrum of issues. E.g., G.A. Res. 69/1 (Sept. 19, 2014) (supporting 
establishment of a U.N. Mission for Ebola Emergency Response, and calling for members’ support); 
G.A. Res. 68/242 (Dec. 27, 2013) (acknowledging rights advances in Myanmar, but calling for further 
action from the junta government). 
9 The United States has been involved in several trade disputes at the DSB as both complainant and 
defendant. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil 
Aircraft (Second Complaint), ¶ 1, WTO Doc. WT/DS353/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2012) (finding U.S. subsidies 
for Boeing’s aircraft production actionable for European country complainants); Appellate Body 
Report, Philippines – Taxes on Distilled Spirits, ¶¶ 62, 242, WTO Doc. WT/DS396/AB/R (Dec. 21, 
2011) (agreeing with the United States’ contention that the Philippines’ excise tax on certain spirits 
based on the raw materials used in their production discriminated against foreign spirits). 
10 Under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) 
founding document, any attack on a member state in Europe or North America is considered an attack 
on all members, triggering a duty of collective defense. North Atlantic Treaty art. 5, opened for 
signature Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243 (entered into force Aug. 29, 1949). The first 
time this Article was invoked occurred immediately after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the 
United States. NATO, NATO Topics – Collective Defence – Article 5, N. ATL. TREATY ORG. (Dec. 16, 
2015), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm?# [https://perma.cc/F6TH-AVUQ]. 
11 One notable example, the Authorization for Use of Military Force against Iraq Resolution, Pub. 
L. No. 102-1, 105 Stat. 3 (1991) [hereinafter AUMF], initiated U.S. involvement in the Persian Gulf
War. The AUMF based its authority in part on a United Nations Security Council Resolution
authorizing member states to use “all necessary means” to resolve the Iraq–Kuwait conflict then
ongoing. S.C. Res 678 (Nov. 29, 1990).
12 Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Missouri v. Holland’s Second Holding, 73 MO. L. REV. 939, 966
(2008). 
13 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 11, 
1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 162 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].  
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the United States.14 In a hypothetical world where the United States ratified 
the Kyoto Protocol, the sliding-scale nature of the obligations it imposes on 
members raises the question of the strength of carbon emissions laws 
Congress could enact to reach such targets. Is a law “requiring” the meeting 
of an “aspirational” or “voluntary” target under penalty a “necessary and 
proper” exercise of Congress’s treaty-executing power? If a treaty target is 
wholly voluntary by its own explicit terms, with no real penalties for 
noncompliance, can Congress pass a strict law with severe criminal or civil 
penalties to meet that target? The questions of how to interpret the 
enforceable extent of the targets in voluntary agreements, and whether the 
targets can be turned into mandatory rather than aspirational, amorphous 
laws, are thus very real concerns in determining the limits of congressional 
power.15 
This Note argues that the two ambiguities pose different, complex 
problems, and therefore require different, complex solutions. For both 
voluntary treaties and post-treaty pronouncements, this Note begins with 
the assumption that a given treaty was ratified within constitutional 
bounds.16 For voluntary treaties, the main constitutional concern is whether 
a proposed implementing statute is reasonable in light of the United States’ 
commitment to and involvement in the treaty. Voluntary treaties must be 
executed by statute in light of the vague delineations of the United States’ 
obligations in the treaty itself—and should thus not be treated as self-
executing17—but this does not grant Congress unlimited license to 
“execute” such a treaty. A statute enforcing a voluntary treaty (1) must be a 
reasonable interpretation of the language and goals of the treaty and (2) 
must enforce the voluntary target to an extent that is reasonable given two 
factors: (a) the level of commitment the United States has most recently 
expressed (prior to the statute’s enactment) and (b) the United States’ 
ability and willingness to comply with voluntary targets. 
For post-treaty pronouncements, the main concerns are the propriety 
of the pronouncement in light of the treaty from which it was generated, 
and the overarching limits imposed by the Constitution, which apply to 
14 But see Curtis A. Bradley, Unratified Treaties, Domestic Politics, and the U.S. Constitution, 
48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 307, 307 (2007) (noting that many commentators argue that the United States “is 
[still] bound to refrain from actions that would defeat the object and purpose of the treaty”). 
15 Concerns about the constitutional limits of treaties in light of their prominence in the federal 
legal structure were alive and well even during the Framing Era. See, e.g., Laura Moranchek Hussain, 
Note, Enforcing the Treaty Rights of Aliens, 117 YALE L.J. 680, 683–84 (2008) (summarizing four main 
critiques that began with Thomas Jefferson).  
16 See supra notes 2–4 and accompanying text (discussing constitutionality requirements for the 
treaty itself). 
17 See infra notes 74–79 and accompanying text (discussing the self-executing-treaty doctrine). 
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treaties and to post-treaty pronouncements.18 As such, a post-treaty 
pronouncement will be incorporated into U.S. law only if (1) it, too, is 
constitutional and (2) the pronouncement was validly made in pursuance of 
the treaty’s procedural law and the treaty organization’s substantive law. 
However, because the pronouncement is not “the treaty,” this Note argues 
that the pronouncement must occupy a lower level of precedence, 
specifically at the same level as a federal statute. This allows states to 
challenge pronouncements on grounds that the pronouncement interferes 
with states’ rights, but creates a rebuttable presumption that the 
pronouncements preempt state laws. This Note offers solutions to the 
ambiguities of contemporary treaties and the problems they generate. But 
given the complexity of the treaty regime, a complex solution is merited. 
Part I provides historical background on treaties, focusing on how they 
were viewed and addressed at the Framing, as well as how they have 
changed in number, scope, and form over time. Part II then looks at 
constitutional approaches to the treaty power in case law on the subject, as 
well as in the scholarly literature to date. Part III articulates the proposed 
tests and shows how they protect all relevant interests—international, 
national, and state. Finally, this Note concludes with the importance and 
implications of a more comprehensive approach to treaties. 
I. THE GROWING COMPLEXITY OF TREATY REGIMES
Understanding the constitutional place of post-treaty pronouncements 
and voluntary treaties requires examining the treatment of treaties 
throughout the history of the United States. Section A briefly traces the 
history of treaties in U.S. law, beginning with the Framers’ views on 
treaties in order to provide an original understanding baseline. Sections B 
and C then analyze the two ways in which treaties have transformed since 
the Framing Era. Section B discusses the emergence of explicitly voluntary 
treaties and treaty provisions, and Section C describes the growth of 
international institutions and organizations making post-treaty 
pronouncements. 
A. Balancing Sovereignty and International Obligations: Treaties in
the Framing Era 
According to the Framers, treaties should be entered into by virtuous 
officeholders under a structure of governmental powers that best serves the 
18 See infra Section III.B. 
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people of the United States.19 The Framers acknowledged the tension 
between establishing a national government to deal with the country’s 
external affairs and with the rights of the states to govern themselves. They 
believed that the United States had to observe the law of nations with 
respect to foreign powers, and argued that this was best done through the 
national government, rather than by the several states or groupings 
thereof.20 One reason was that, for treaties to be meaningfully executed in 
the United States, treaty obligations must be expounded evenly across the 
states.21 The Framers’ concern for full and even execution was practical; 
elsewhere in The Federalist Papers, they noted that perceived or actual 
breach by one party to a treaty, even in just a part of the country, essentially 
relieved the others of their own obligations, undermining the main goal of 
cooperation underlying the treaty.22 
In order to support the full enforcement of treaties, the Framers 
located the treaty power in the federal government. Specifically, they 
placed it in the concurrent hands of the executive—the President—and the 
19 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 64, at 369 (John Jay) (Kathleen M. Sullivan ed., 2009). (“The 
power of making treaties is an important one . . . and it should not be delegated but in such a mode . . . 
as will afford the highest security that it will be exercised by men . . . in the manner most conducive to 
the public good.”). 
20 These concerns were not novel at the time the Constitution was written. Notably, the Articles of 
Confederation also allocated the treaty-making power to the federal government, not to the states. 
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. VI, § 1; see generally William W. Potter, Judicial Power in 
the United States, 27 MICH. L. REV. 285, 285 (1929). 
21 As Madison writes: 
The powers to make treaties and to send and receive ambassadors speak their own propriety. Both 
of them are comprised in the Articles of Confederation, with this difference only, that the former 
is disembarrassed by the plan of the convention, of an exception under which treaties might be 
substantially frustrated by regulations of the States; and that a power of appointing and receiving 
“other public ministers and consuls” is expressly and very properly added to the former provision 
concerning ambassadors. 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, supra note 19, at 235 (James Madison) (emphasis added); see also John T. 
Parry, Congress, the Supremacy Clause, and the Implementation of Treaties, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 
1209, 1219–20 (2009) (describing John Jay’s pressing for the inclusion of treaties in the Supremacy 
Clause in light of his experiences negotiating treaties as the Confederation’s Secretary of Foreign 
Affairs); Potter, supra note 20, at 309 (In drafting the Constitution, the Framers “provided that no state 
should enter into any treaty or alliance or confederation . . . and in order to remove any doubt about the 
supremacy of this direct legislation by the people, they declared this [C]onstitution and the laws made 
in pursuance thereof and all treaties made or which shall be made to be the supreme law of the land.”). 
22 The Framers addressed such reciprocity in their comparison of the governing structure under the 
Articles of Confederation—perceived as a simple treaty between the several states—with their proposed 
union:  
It is an established doctrine on the subject of treaties that all the articles are mutually conditions of 
each other; that a breach of any one article is a breach of the whole treaty; and that a breach, 
committed by either of the parties, absolves the others, and authorizes them, if they please, to 
pronounce the compact violated and void.  
THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, supra note 19, at 250 (James Madison). 
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Senate (or, rather, two-thirds thereof).23 This divided structure of the treaty 
power was further motivated by the Framers’ fears of a tyrannical all-
powerful executive, like the English King.24 More importantly for the 
purposes of this Note, the same concern prompted the Framers to rank 
treaties as among the sources of “the supreme Law of the Land,” next to the 
Constitution itself.25 That the Framers noted the necessity of giving treaties 
a paramount place in the structure of federal laws dovetails well with their 
placing of the primary responsibility to enter into treaties—albeit with the 
advice and consent of the Senate—in the federal executive.26 
The Framers had less to say about how treaties were to be interpreted 
for the purposes of enacting them domestically. This may be because 
treaties at the time of the Framing were relatively simple agreements.27 
Indeed, the United States did not even enter into any multilateral treaties 
until 1825.28 Thus, interpreting treaties could hardly be seen as complicated 
or contestable; domestic obligations under treaties would have been self-
explanatory without much, if any, further legislation.29 To the extent that 
the Framers anticipated problems with treaty interpretation, they put final 
23 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, supra note 19, at 398 (Alexander 
Hamilton).  
24 THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, supra note 19, at 399 (Alexander Hamilton) (“In this respect, therefore, 
there is no comparison between the intended power of the President and the actual power of the British 
sovereign. The one can perform alone what the other can do only with the concurrence of a branch of 
the legislature.”); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 75, supra note 19, at 432 (Alexander Hamilton) 
(“However proper or safe it may be in governments where the executive magistrate is an hereditary 
monarch, to commit to him the entire power of making treaties, it would be utterly unsafe and improper 
to intrust that power to an elective magistrate of four years’ duration.”). 
25 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, supra note 19, at 120 (Alexander 
Hamilton) (“Laws are a dead letter without courts to expound and define their true meaning and 
operation. The treaties of the United States, to have any force at all, must be considered as part of the 
law of the land.”). 
26 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
27 The French–American alliance treaties during the revolutionary period illustrate the relative 
simplicity of early bilateral treaties. See, e.g., Treaty of Alliance Between the United States of America 
and His Most Christian Majesty, Fr.-U.S., Feb. 6, 1778, 8 Stat. 6 [hereinafter Treaty of Alliance]; 
Treaty of Amity and Commerce Between the United States of America and His Most Christian Majesty, 
Fr.-U.S., Feb. 6, 1778, 8 Stat. 12 [hereinafter Treaty of Amity and Commerce]. Each is written in both 
English and French, yet the Treaty of Alliance and Treaty of Amity and Commerce span only six and 
twenty pages respectively (including both language versions), and establish obligations without creating 
a formal organization or creating much space to expand the scope of their provisions. 
28 1 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
1776-1949, at v (Charles I. Bevans ed., 1968) (table of contents of a leading compilation of early 
international agreements to which the United States was a signatory, showing that only bilateral 
agreements existed until 1825). 
29 Hathaway et al., supra note 1, at 245 (“The Framers did not delve deeply into the question of 
implementing legislation. They instead assumed that most treaties would not require it. As a result, the 
relationship they intended between the Treaty Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause has been the 
subject of subsequent debate.”). 
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authority of treaty interpretation in the Supreme Court, not in Congress.30 
This was a logical decision in light of the Framers’ determination that 
treaties are federal law and “the supreme Law of the Land,” alongside the 
Constitution.31 This does not preclude Congress’s authority to enforce 
treaties through statutes, but does subject such statutes to final review by 
the courts. The explicit move to put final jurisdiction over issues of treaty 
interpretation in the Supreme Court, rather than the other branches, 
suggests that the Framers envisioned a strong role for the judiciary in 
determining treaties as “higher law,” rather than applying the same plea for 
judicial deference as in ordinary statutory interpretation cases.32 
One limitation to the contemporary applicability of the Framers’ 
assumptions and beliefs regarding the treaty power is that those principles 
came into being in a time when treaty regimes were relatively simple. 
Nonetheless, looking to the Framers’ original understanding of how treaties 
operated in the system of divided government they envisioned provides a 
strong starting point for examining how and to what extent Framing Era 
treaty principles apply today. 
B. Managing Global Order in a Diversifying International Arena:
Voluntary Treaties 
In recent years, treaties and treaty organizations have become more 
complicated, in no small part due to the increasing role of nongovernmental 
organizations in international law and politics,33 the increasing number of, 
and diversity among, nation-states in the international world order,34 and 
the wider scope of topics in which international law has become involved 
30 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, 
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be 
made, under their Authority . . . .”). As Hamilton notes with respect to treaties: 
Their true import, as far as respects individuals, must, like all other laws, be ascertained by 
judicial determinations. To produce uniformity in these determinations, they ought to be 
submitted, in the last resort, to one SUPREME TRIBUNAL. And this tribunal ought to be 
instituted under the same authority which forms the treaties themselves. 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, supra note 19, at 120–21 (Alexander Hamilton). 
31 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
32 See, e.g., Robert A. Schapiro, Judicial Deference and Interpretive Coordinacy in State and 
Federal Constitutional Law, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 656, 660 (2000) (suggesting courts’ deference to the 
legislature should vary depending on the particular legal issue at hand); Louis J. Virelli III, Judicial 
Deference to Congress and the Separation of Powers, 98 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 28, 30–31 (2013) (linking 
courts’ deference to Congress to areas in which no overlap between the branches’ authority is present). 
33 See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599,
2624 (1997). 
34 See, e.g., Laurence R. Helfer, Understanding Change in International Organizations: 
Globalization and Innovation in the ILO, 59 VAND. L. REV. 649, 651 (2006) (noting the quadrupling of 
member states in the International Labor Organization (ILO) as one backdrop factor behind the changes 
in the ILO over time). 
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and intermixed with other complex laws.35 Because of the wide range of 
nation-states’ resources and abilities to meet international standards, 
international organizations have had to manage expectations to induce both 
less-developed and more resistant nation-states to join and comply.36 
Likewise, as international organizations’ mandates extended into ever 
broader areas of law and regulation, properly managing these expectations 
increased the willingness of nation-states—developed and developing 
alike—to comply. Voluntary treaties adjusted to this new reality by setting 
aspirational targets, rather than mandatory minima or maxima that had to 
be met at pain of sanction.37 The flexibility these aspirational targets afford 
countries fits a new context in which states vary drastically in their abilities 
to meet certain goals.38 This is especially the case for international 
agreements bearing on issues whose resolution would require significant 
financial investment, human resources, and technological expenditures on 
the part of member countries.39 Moreover, for developed and developing 
countries alike, voluntary targets allow governments some leeway to 
manage their sometimes conflicting diplomatic obligations to other nations 
with their domestic obligations to their national electorates.40 Despite 
35 Koh, supra note 33, at 2614 (“In the wake of . . . World War II, the architects of the postwar 
system replaced the preexisting loose customary web of state-centric rules with an ambitious positivistic 
order, built on institutions and constitutions: international institutions governed by multilateral treaties 
organizing proactive assaults on all manner of global problems.”). For an illustrative description of how 
international treaties have come to comprehensively regulate investment, see Joost Pauwelyn, Dealing 
with the Increasing Complexity of Investment-Related Treaties: A Framework and Some Policy 
Guidelines, 3 INV. TREATY NEWS 5 (2012), http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2012/iisd_itn_october_2012_en.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5ZD4-XC62]. 
36 Koh, supra note 33, at 2636–38. 
37 For example, Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty imposes the following “soft” 
obligations without penalty of sanction in case of failure: “Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes 
to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race 
at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament 
under strict and effective international control.” NPT, supra note 7, art. VI. Another example, in the 
form of a post-treaty pronouncement, is the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals, which set 
health and education targets for developing countries, which are not explicitly penalized when not met. 
G.A. Res. 55/2, United Nations Millennium Declaration (Sept. 18, 2000) [hereinafter U.N. MDGs]. 
38 The Kyoto Protocol is an instructive example, given the wide variation in signatories’ abilities to 
implement carbon-reducing technologies. The Protocol sets certain obligations for more advanced 
Annex I countries, which are not extended to non-Annex I countries. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 13, art. 
2, § 1. 
39 See, e.g., Randall Lutter, Developing Countries’ Greenhouse Emissions: Uncertainty and 
Implications for Participation in the Kyoto Protocol, 21 ENERGY J. 93, 93–94 (2000) (noting that the 
Kyoto Protocol gives developing countries the option, but not the obligation, to match developed 
country signatories’ carbon emissions caps). 
40 The field of international relations construes this dilemma as a “multilevel game,” where 
different obligations and resources at the international diplomacy level and the domestic political level 
provide both obstacles and opportunities for government representatives in international negotiations. 
See generally Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 
42 INT’L ORG. 427 (1988). 
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arguments that this flexible structure undermines accountability, and 
ultimately success, to allow even developing countries this license,41 
voluntary treaties remain an essential part of the international law regime 
today. 
To the extent that treaties with voluntary, aspirational targets still 
depend on signatory nation-states’ voluntary compliance due to the absence 
of a global sovereign, some scholars have argued that the emergence of 
voluntary treaties would result in no real divergence from the prior state of 
international relations.42 Whatever the ramifications of this development for 
international politics scholars, voluntary treaties do pose a significant 
problem for legal scholars trying to determine the boundaries of domestic 
treaty interpretation and enforcement. This issue is best framed through the 
Necessary and Proper Clause of the Constitution: given that an 
international agreement imposes obligations that are not mandatory, and 
that the United States may face no sanction if it violates those obligations, 
what, if anything, can Congress enact through statute that is truly 
“necessary and proper” for the enforcement of and compliance with the 
treaty?43 This perplexing question illustrates why voluntary treaties pose a 
unique constitutional issue that sets them apart from mandatory 
agreements. 
41 Not all authors believe flexibility in treaty goals based on level of development is a good thing. 
See, e.g., Mac Darrow, The Millennium Development Goals: Milestones or Millstones? Human Rights 
Priorities for the Post-2015 Development Agenda, 15 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. J. 55, 59–60 (2012) 
(noting the common argument that the lack of a strong accountability mechanism for U.N. MDGs 
undermines their enforcement). 
42 Two important lines of scholarship in this area are efficient breach theory and realist 
international relations. Efficient breach scholarship emphasizes that, regardless of the “hardness” or 
“softness” of rules, parties will breach an agreement if doing so is more beneficial to them than 
upholding their obligations. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Alan O. Sykes, Efficient Breach of International 
Law: Optimal Remedies, “Legalized Noncompliance,” and Related Issues, 110 MICH. L. REV. 243, 
254–55 (2011) (arguing that countries may breach in order to retaliate against other noncompliant 
countries); Note, (In)Efficient Breach of International Trade Law: The State of the “Free Pass” After 
China’s Rare Earths Export Embargo, 125 HARV. L. REV. 602, 602–03 (2011) (acknowledging that 
states may defect from agreements when they can expect a “free pass” from the regulating body). 
Realist international relations scholars focus on anarchy in international relations: nation-states’ 
decisionmaking is constrained less by formal institutions and more by informal power structures and 
relative relationships in an international arena without a true ruling sovereign. See, e.g., Joseph M. 
Grieco, Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal 
Institutionalism, 42 INT’L ORG. 485, 487 (1988) (arguing that nation-states’ cooperation depends on 
concerns about others cheating and their concerns about the relative gains of other states); Oona A. 
Hathaway, Between Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory of International Law, 72 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 469, 478 (2005) (noting that traditional realist theory expects enforcement and compliance to 
depend on the interests of the most powerful states). 
43 Even recently, the definition of “necessary” in the Necessary and Proper Clause has remained at 
issue. Compare McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 356, 386–88 (1819) (arguing that 
“necessary” means “needful and adapted,” not “absolutely necessary” or indispensable), with Nat’l 
Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (Sebelius), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2592 (2012) (arguing that “necessary” 
covers exercises only of “authority derivative of, and in service to, a granted power”).  
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C. Beyond the Four Corners of the Treaty:
Post-Treaty Pronouncements
Another complication emerged when treaties began setting up new 
institutions and organizations to enforce their directives. The United States 
has been involved in several such institution-creating treaties, including 
those that gave rise to the U.N.,44 NATO,45 and the WTO.46 Such 
institutions were created to centralize the authority needed to expound on 
the foundational principles in their establishing treaties, as well as to 
enforce those principles and others that may emerge later.47 At least in part, 
treaty institutions hoped to be the missing third-party enforcement 
mechanisms that made most international politics essentially voluntary for 
nation-states,48 though some have argued that, for various reasons, they 
tend to be rather ineffective at performing this function.49 
Regardless of international institutions’ efficacy, an important 
consequence of this development is that treaty organizations enact their 
own law in varying ways, including the adoption of resolutions, which 
resembles legislative lawmaking, and the resolution of disputes in 
international judiciary-like institutions.50 Such post-treaty pronouncements, 
while helpful in forwarding the goals of the treaty organization itself, pose 
a conundrum for U.S. constitutional law. The pronouncements are clearly 
44 U.N. Charter. 
45 North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 10. 
46 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 
154 [hereinafter WTO Agreement]. 
47 See, e.g., Michael N. Barnett & Martha Finnemore, The Politics, Power and Pathologies of 
International Organizations, 53 INT’L ORG. 699, 707 (1999); see generally Michael J. Gilligan & Leslie 
Johns, Formal Models of International Institutions, 15 ANN. REV. OF POL. SCI. 221 (2012) (reviewing 
literature on forms and functions of international institutions). 
48 See Gilligan & Johns, supra note 47, at 225; see also Paul R. Milgrom, Douglass C. North & 
Barry R. Weingast, The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, 
and the Champagne Fairs, 2 ECON. & POL. 1, 3 (1990) (“In a large community . . . it would be too 
costly to keep everyone informed about what transpires in all trading relationships, as a simple 
reputation system might require. So the system of private judges is designed to promote private 
resolution of disputes and otherwise to transmit just enough information . . . to enable the reputation 
mechanism to function effectively for enforcement.”) (emphasis in original). 
49 Some point out treaty organizations’ lack of resources as a key problem for enforcement. See, 
e.g., Indira Carr & Opi Outhwaite, The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in Combating
Corruption: Theory and Practice, 44 SUFFOLK UNIV. L. REV. 615, 621 (2011); Kevin Kolben, The
WTO Distraction, 21 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 461, 482 (2010). Others are more concerned that treaty
organizations are prone to be captured by certain powerful nation-states, rendering them imperfect
enforcement organs against these captor countries. See, e.g., Richard H. Steinberg, In the Shadow of
Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO, 56 INT’L ORG. 339, 
365 (2002) (noting that the WTO has become less effective in regulating powerful nation-states due to
organizational capture).
50 See supra notes 8–9 (giving examples of resolutions by different organs of the U.N. and cases at 
the DSB). 
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not “treaties,” since the President of the United States did not directly sign 
these pronouncements with the advice and consent of the Senate.51 Nor is 
there necessarily any input by any party directly accountable to the people 
of the United States in these resolutions and judgments. Finally, at least one 
commentator has raised the concern that granting authority to treaty bodies 
to engage in the production of post-treaty pronouncements raises red flags 
under the nondelegation doctrine.52 
Yet to refuse enforcing post-treaty pronouncements altogether may 
undermine the very purpose of the United States in joining the original 
treaty, which itself is “the supreme Law of the Land.”53 For treaties 
generating post-treaty pronouncements, part of the original treaty itself is 
the creation of an organization whose purpose is to expound on the original 
treaty. The United States is aware of the creation of the treaty organization 
upon ratification—and in its ratification, the United States consents to 
subject itself to the organization’s powers as enshrined in the original 
treaty. Unless the United States intends to eschew its international 
obligations—and indeed, its own Constitution—it must find a way to 
incorporate post-treaty pronouncements into its own laws. But in light of 
the constitutional conflicts discussed above, it is critical to carefully craft 
the conditions for and the manner of incorporation of post-treaty 
pronouncements into federal law. The question is what level of precedence 
acts in pursuance of those post-treaty pronouncements should receive. 
II. PERSPECTIVES ON THE TREATY POWER
Part II considers existing approaches from the judiciary and legal 
scholars to modern treaties and whether they adequately address the 
complications discussed above. Section A first examines leading Supreme 
Court cases that bear on the constitutional place of treaties. Section B then 
explores legal scholarship considering the quandaries of contemporary 
treaty doctrine. Ultimately, this Part demonstrates that both areas of legal 
thought fall short of adequately addressing the complexity posed by 
modern treaties. 
51 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (granting power to enter into treaties to the President, but only 
with the advice and consent of the Senate). 
52 Curtis A. Bradley, International Delegations, the Structural Constitution, and Non-Self-
Execution, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1569–70 (2003). 
53 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
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A. A Lukewarm Approach: Supreme Court Jurisprudence on
Treaty Implementation 
The Supreme Court has addressed the standard for a treaty-enforcing 
statute’s constitutional validity in several cases. The doctrine that has 
evolved, however, both reaches an unsatisfying conclusion on how 
domestic and international obligations should constitutionally be balanced, 
and leaves ambiguous the answers to several legal questions raised earlier 
in this Note. 
In the seminal case Missouri v. Holland,54 the Supreme Court rightly 
noted that enforcement of a treaty by statute runs into an issue of 
conflicting dual sovereignties, namely, the conflicting sovereignties of the 
states and of the federal government.55 In this case, the U.S. and Canada 
(then under the dominion of the United Kingdom) entered into a treaty to 
regulate the hunting of migratory birds.56 The State of Missouri rejected the 
congressional act implementing the treaty, and argued it infringed on its 
Tenth Amendment powers and was therefore unconstitutional.57 
The primary test the Court imposed on acts of Congress enforcing 
treaties is whether the treaty itself is constitutionally valid; if so, an act of 
Congress enforcing the provisions of that treaty would clearly be necessary 
and proper to give legal effect to the treaty within the scope of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause.58 The Court noted that, unlike acts of 
Congress, whose validity depends on whether they were “made in 
pursuance of the Constitution,” treaties’ validity depends on whether they 
were “made under the authority of the United States,” which the Court 
noted ambiguously may or may not refer to the Constitution.59 Finding no 
constitutional infringement by the treaty at issue—including no overstep of 
Missouri’s reserved state powers in violation of the Tenth Amendment—
the Court found that the statute supporting a bilateral treaty regulating the 
54 252 U.S. 416 (1920). 
55 Id. at 420–21, 432–33. 
56 Id. at 430–31. 
57 Id. at 431. 
58 Id. at 432; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
59 Holland, 252 U.S. at 433; see also id. (“It is open to question whether the authority of the United 
States means more than the formal acts prescribed [in the Constitution] to make the convention.”); 
Samar, supra note 1, at 306 (noting that the “Authority of the United States” in Justice Holmes’s test is 
distinct from, and broader than, mere constitutionality). Professor Samar argues that, because Holland 
clearly distinguished the “Authority of the United States” test from a simple constitutionality inquiry, 
courts opining on the validity of a particular treaty must look beyond to general principles “to which 
Americans are so attached,” including “justice, fairness, due process, and liberty.” Samar, supra note 1, 
at 357. 
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hunting of migratory birds was valid. Consequently, the statute Congress 
enacted to enforce it was valid.60 
The Court elaborated on its Holland holding in later cases. In Reid v. 
Covert,61 the Court appeared to turn away from Justice Holmes’s distinction 
between the underlying validity test for acts of Congress and for treaties in 
Holland,62 instead finding constitutionality of the act of Congress itself—
not just the treaty on which it was based—was the proper test for the 
validity of treaties and treaty enforcement.63 The Supreme Court thus found 
the treaty at issue in Reid, which granted jurisdiction over U.S. civilians on 
military bases abroad to the U.S. military courts, unconstitutional because 
enforcing it would violate the civilians’ Fifth and Sixth Amendment 
rights.64 
Later, in Bond v. United States,65 the Court faced a statute interpreting 
and enforcing the Chemical Weapons Convention.66 Writing for a 9–0 
Court, Chief Justice Roberts resolved the case not on constitutional 
grounds, but instead dismissed the criminal case against petitioner Ms. 
Bond based on the Court’s judgment that the enforcing statute did not reach 
her conduct.67 Three concurring Justices, however, would have preferred to 
resolve the case through an analysis of the limits of the treaty power in a 
federal constitutional context. Justice Scalia argued that the statute in 
question, as in Reid, did violate the Bill of Rights by infringing on states’ 
reserved power to regulate local criminal law under the Tenth 
Amendment.68 Justices Thomas and Alito, writing separate concurrences, 
found a different constitutional violation: the statute was an improper 
60 Holland, 252 U.S. at 435. 
61 354 U.S. 1 (1957). 
62 252 U.S. at 433. 
63 Reid, 354 U.S. at 16 (“There is nothing in [the] language [of the Supremacy Clause] which 
intimates that treaties and laws enacted pursuant to them do not have to comply with the provisions of 
the Constitution.”). 
64 Id. at 19. The Court also considered whether anything else in the Constitution would authorize 
military court jurisdiction over U.S. civilians on U.S. foreign military bases, and found no such 
provision. Id. at 21 n.40 and accompanying text (holding that Congress’s power “to make rules for the 
government and regulation of the land and naval forces” under Article 1, Section 8, Clause 14 does not 
permit this jurisdiction); id. at 40–41 (holding that the U.S. Constitution only allows courts of law, and 
not military tribunals, to try civilians for crimes). 
65 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014). 
66 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of 
Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, opened for signature Jan. 13, 1993, S. Treaty Doc. No. 
103–21, 1974 U.N.T.S. 317 (entered into force Apr. 29, 1997) [hereinafter Chemical Weapons 
Convention]. The statute involved in Bond implemented the Chemical Weapons Convention by making 
it a federal crime to knowingly “possess[] or use . . . any chemical weapon.” 18 U.S.C. § 229(a)(1) 
(2012). 
67 Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2087. 
68 Id. at 2101 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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exercise of the Treaty Power because such an exercise could only be valid 
if the implementing statute had a sufficient nexus with foreign affairs.69 For 
both Justices, a local criminal law certainly could not meet this standard. 
The closest the Supreme Court has come to addressing head-on the 
complex issues raised by voluntary treaties and post-treaty pronouncements 
was in Medellin v. Texas.70 Mr. Medellin was convicted of murder, 
sentenced to death, and imprisoned pending execution in Texas.71 He was 
one of fifty-one Mexican nationals detained by the United States who were 
parties to an International Court of Justice (ICJ) case, referred to as 
Avena,72 which ruled that fifty-one of those detained Mexican nationals had 
not been properly informed of their rights under the Vienna Convention.73 
Mr. Medellin relied on the ICJ ruling and on a presidential memorandum 
purporting to give domestic effect to that ruling in order to file a second 
habeas application in Texas state court challenging his death sentence on 
the grounds that he was not informed of his Vienna Convention rights.74 In 
rejecting Mr. Medellin’s habeas petition, the Supreme Court held that the 
ICJ ruling did not have domestic legal effect.75 The majority ruled that any 
international obligation only has domestic legal effect if it is either (1) 
enforced by Congress pursuant to its authority under the Necessary and 
Proper Clause—not by the President through a memorandum—or (2) if it is 
self-executing.76 A treaty is self-executing only if it “operates of itself 
69 Id. at 2103 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 2111 (Alito, J., concurring in the 
judgment). 
70 552 U.S. 491 (2008). 
71 Id. at 498. 
72 Id. at 497–98; Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), Judgment, 
2004 I.C.J. 12, ¶ 15 (Mar. 31).  
73 Medellin, 552 U.S. at 497–98; Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. 
U.S.), Judgment, 2004 I.C.J. 12, ¶ 106 (Mar. 31) (citing Vienna Convention on Consular Relations,
opened for signature Apr. 24 1963, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 (entered into force Mar. 19,
1967) [hereinafter Vienna Convention]).
74 Medellin, 552 U.S. at 498. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 504–05 (citing Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888); Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 
253, 314 (1829), overruled in part by United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. 51 (1833); Igartua–De La 
Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145, 150 (1st Cir. 2005) (en banc) (Boudin, C.J.)). The Court explained 
the self-executing treaty doctrine in an early case: 
Our constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is, consequently, to be regarded in 
courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself without the 
aid of any legislative provision. But when the terms of the stipulation import a contract, when 
either of the parties engages to perform a particular act, the treaty addresses itself to the political, 
not the judicial department; and the legislature must execute the contract before it can become a 
rule for the Court. 
Foster, 27 U.S. at 314. 
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without the aid of any legislative provision.”77 However, the ICJ ruling did 
not so operate, because the Optional Protocol,78 which the United States 
ratified and under which the United States agreed to ICJ jurisdiction over 
Vienna Convention disputes, granted jurisdiction to the ICJ but lacked any 
language describing the domestic enforceability of ICJ cases decided under 
this grant of jurisdiction.79 Because Congress had not enacted a statute 
domestically enforcing Avena or ICJ rulings generally, the Court held that 
Avena had no domestic enforceability whatsoever. 
The Medellin rule unsatisfactorily allows the United States to formally 
subject itself to international organizations and treaties, but to get out of its 
obligations because Congress was haphazard or devious in failing to 
implement a ratified treaty with sufficiently strong language. Medellin also 
does not address the strength of language required for a treaty to become 
self-executing, leaving ambiguity in how its own rule would be enforced in 
the future. Additionally, Medellin does not address the problem of 
precedence discussed above: if domestically enforceable, would the 
pronouncements under such treaties also be part of the supreme law of the 
land, even if these pronouncements technically are not treaties?80 Finally, to 
the issue of treaties with language that is more indefinite and aspirational 
than mandatory, Medellin suggests that such treaties simply would be 
unenforceable due to the softness of the text—certainly an absurd result 
that runs afoul of U.S. ratification of that treaty. As such, Supreme Court 
jurisprudence to date leaves U.S. obligations under post-treaty 
pronouncements and voluntary treaties up in the air. 
B. Too Narrow a Debate: Treaties in Scholarly Literature
Scholarly literature on the treaty power has much to say about what 
rules govern the kinds of treaties the United States can enter.81 For the 
77 Medellin, 552 U.S. at 505 (citing Foster, 27 U.S. at 314); see also Charles W. Stotter, Comment, 
Self-Executing Treaties and the Human Rights Provisions of the United Nations Charter: A Separation 
of Powers Problem, 25 BUFF. L. REV. 773, 773 (1976). 
78 Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations Concerning the Compulsory 
Settlement of Disputes, opened for signature Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 325, 596 U.N.T.S. 487 (entered 
into force Mar. 19, 1967) [hereinafter Optional Protocol].  
79 Medellin, 552 U.S. at 507–08 (“The Protocol says nothing about the effect of an ICJ decision and 
does not itself commit signatories to comply with an ICJ judgment. The Protocol is similarly silent as to 
any enforcement mechanism.”). 
80 See supra Section I.C. 
81 For example, scholars have raised concerns about the constitutionality of executive agreements 
and presidential memoranda, which fail the “advice and consent of the Senate” requirement. See, e.g., 
Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 390, 391–92 (1998); 
A. Mark Weisburd, International Judicial Decisions, Domestic Courts, and the Foreign Affairs Power,
2005 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 287, 319–20. They have also considered whether treaty obligations involve
impermissible commandeering of the states. See Bradley, supra, at 409; Hathaway et al., supra note 1,
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purposes of this Note, however, the more salient question is what limits can 
or should be imposed on the domestic enforcement of treaties—and the 
pronouncements that follow them. This Note presumes that a treaty has 
been properly made, thereby skipping past direct consideration of limits on 
the treaty-making power. 
The existing literature only indirectly addresses the issue of voluntary 
treaties. The main discussion centers on whether treaties should be 
presumed to be self-executing,82 barring language expressly providing 
otherwise,83 or whether treaties should presumptively be non-self-
executing, unless the language makes clear that the treaty can be enforced 
without further legislation.84 Opponents of a presumption that treaties are 
self-executing claim that this presumption undermines checks on the extent 
of the federal government’s treaty power.85 In contrast, supporters of a 
presumption of self-execution base their claim on the language of the 
Supremacy Clause, which puts treaties alongside the Constitution as the 
law of the land.86 
at 271–74; Edward T. Swaine, Negotiating Federalism: State Bargaining and the Dormant Treaty 
Power, 49 DUKE L.J. 1127, 1261 (2000). Still others have considered whether Article I or II grants of 
power to Congress and the President impose subject matter limitations on what treaties are permissible. 
See Bradley, supra, at 453 (arguing that one way to limit what subjects treaties can cover is to permit 
them only when an issue “needs” international cooperation); Hathaway et al., supra note 1, at 290–99 
(finding treaties to be valid only if they are not a pretext for the federal government infringing on the 
rights of states and if there is a reasonable international purpose for the treaty). Finally, authors have 
questioned whether federalism bars treaties that interfere impermissibly with states’ rights and powers. 
See Bradley, supra, at 411 (arguing that the Framers expected treaties only to cover issues that were 
truly international—such as war, peace, and commerce—and are therefore inappropriate to regulate 
state issues); Swaine, supra, at 1138, 1142–43, 1146–48 (arguing that “dormant foreign affairs” and 
“dormant treaty” powers exist, because the Constitution locates both these powers in the federal 
government, not the states); Benjamin Beiter, Note, Beyond Medellin: Reconsidering Federalism Limits 
on the Treaty Power, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1163, 1175–76 (2010) (suggesting a presumption that 
treaties are non-self-executing as a means to rein in the federal government’s treaty-making power). 
82 See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
83 See, e.g., Beiter, supra note 81, at 1175 (arguing that a non-self-execution presumption imposes 
proper federalism checks on the federal government); id. at 1183 (arguing that Medellin created such a 
presumption). While treaties may be non-self-executing because they are insufficiently emphatic in 
their language, Professor Damrosch notes that the Senate has also turned treaties non-self-executing by 
declaring qualified consent to the President that the treaty should not be used as a direct source of law in 
domestic courts. Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Role of the United States Senate Concerning “Self-
Executing” and “Non-Self-Executing” Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 515, 515 (1991). 
84 See, e.g., Carter, supra note 1, at 357 (arguing that the non-self-executing treaty doctrine flies in 
the face of the Supremacy Clause’s clear language); Vazquez, supra note 1, at 602 (noting that because 
the Supremacy Clause puts treaties on parity with the Constitution, it would not make sense to require 
them to be subject to the self-executing inquiry). Professor Hathaway and colleagues argue that the 
Framers did not address the self-execution question because they assumed most treaties, if not all, 
would be. Hathaway et al., supra note 1, at 250. 
85 See, e.g., Beiter, supra note 81, at 1187–88. 
86 Carter, supra note 1, at 345; see also Vazquez, supra note 1, at 615–16 (arguing that the Framers 
wrote the Supremacy Clause explicitly to contravene the British approach, under which treaties were 
not enforceable as domestic law).  
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However, the debate about whether treaties are self-executing does not 
resolve the issue of voluntary treaties.87 Whether a treaty requires further 
legislation to enforce its contents is a separate issue from whether its 
contents suggest voluntary or mandatory targets. The closest the literature 
comes to addressing voluntary treaties is in Professor Vazquez’s discussion 
of aspirational treaties.88 However, Professor Vazquez only defines such 
treaties in the abstract, without discussing the implications of the 
aspirational or indefinite language or the extent to which they may be 
executed, by statute or by presumption.89 As such, we remain in the dark on 
this topic. 
Existing scholarship says even less about post-treaty pronouncements. 
One viewpoint on this issue argues that a post-treaty pronouncement should 
be automatically enforceable as domestic law so long as the originating 
treaty is itself valid, implying that the pronouncement is a simple extension 
of the treaty and is thus entitled to similar constitutional precedence.90 The 
main countervailing opinion argues that simply granting jurisdiction to an 
international organization on a domestic case regarding issues in a treaty is 
insufficient; for that organization’s judgment to be as effective as domestic 
law, it would require explicit language in either the jurisdiction-granting 
treaty or in a separate statute enforcing the judgment domestically.91 This 
latter position effectively analogizes post-treaty pronouncements to 
separate, individual treaties, and applies the self-executing treaty doctrine 
to them as such. 
Discussions regarding the proper level of precedence for international 
law only directly address whether treaties should be considered on par or 
below the Constitution, thus failing to distinguish the treaty from the post-
treaty pronouncement.92 Implicitly, this discussion touches on the level of 
87 See also infra Section III.A (elaborating on the self-executing treaty doctrine in the test for 
voluntary treaties). 
88 Vazquez, supra note 12, at 966. 
89 Id. (“Distinguishing aspirational from obligatory treaties will not always be an easy task. I do not 
address that issue here beyond noting that the aspirational category I have in mind consists of treaties 
that would not be violated even if nothing were done to implement them.”). 
90 See, e.g., Samar, supra note 1, at 345–46. Professor Samar goes even further by arguing that, in 
cases where the United States has properly submitted itself to the jurisdiction of an international court, 
such a court, not any U.S. federal or state court (the U.S. Supreme Court included), should be the final 
arbiter of matters over which the international court has jurisdiction based on its originating treaty. Id. 
91 See, e.g., Beiter, supra note 81, at 1194–95. 
92 For example, Professor Bradley, who argues against a self-executing presumption, claims that 
treaties should have a lower rank than the Constitution, equivalent to acts of Congress. Bradley, supra 
note 81, at 456–58. In contrast, other authors argue that the Supremacy Clause is clear in putting 
treaties—and impliedly, post-treaty pronouncements—on the same level as the Constitution, 
preempting all other federal or state law. See, e.g., Carter, supra note 1, at 349; Vazquez, supra note 1, 
at 602. 
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precedence, albeit simplistically—either the pronouncement is an extension 
of the treaty, and is therefore entitled to treaty-level precedence, or it is not, 
and is therefore entitled to no precedence. In light of the concerns 
mentioned earlier in this Note, both these answers are unsatisfactory.93 
Thus, the literature to date answers neither of the two questions this Note 
poses regarding post-treaty pronouncements: (1) under what conditions 
they should be enforceable as domestic law and (2) whether their departure 
from the typical treaty procedure means they should be granted lesser 
precedence in U.S. law. After all, just because acts of Congress are made in 
pursuance of the Constitution does not grant them equal status to the 
Constitution; why should post-treaty pronouncements be granted greater 
deference? 
III. RESOLVING THE GAP: A MORE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH
TO TREATIES 
As the preceding Parts demonstrate, academic scholarship and current 
jurisprudence alike fall short of addressing the complexities of 
contemporary treaties. On the one hand, these shortcomings stem from an 
overly simplistic approach to treaty incorporation and enforcement, 
reducing such questions to surface-level inquiries, such as whether a treaty 
is self-executing, or whether the treaty itself violates the Tenth 
Amendment. On the other hand, it is possible that scholarship on treaties 
simply has not kept up with changes in international treaty regime realities. 
This Part attempts to address the complexities of both voluntary 
treaties and post-treaty pronouncements by proposing separate 
constitutional inquiries for each, thereby applying necessarily more 
complex solutions to more complex constitutional quandaries. The 
assumption at this point in the analysis is that the treaty itself has already 
been established as constitutionally valid; the remaining inquiry is how it 
and the post-treaty pronouncements it generates will be incorporated into 
U.S. law. Section A first proposes a two-step reasonableness inquiry for 
implementing voluntary treaties by statute. Section B then describes the 
mechanics and qualifications for incorporating post-treaty pronouncements 
into the structure of federal law. 
93 See supra Section I.C (arguing that giving post-treaty pronouncements treaty-level precedence is 
inappropriate given the constitutional requirements for treaty making, but also that giving them no 
precedence is likewise improper because doing so lets the United States sidestep treaties that grant 
jurisdiction to an international organization with post-treaty pronouncement-making authority). 
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A. A Doubly-Reasonable Interpretive Approach to Voluntary Treaties
The enforceable substance of voluntary treaties must be interpreted in
light of what is “reasonable.” The reasonableness approach to treaties is not 
without precedent. For example, Professor Hathaway and colleagues argue 
that, as a limit to the treaty-making power under federalism and separation 
of powers principles, all treaties and statutes implementing them must pass 
a “reasonable international purpose” test.94 Echoing concurrences by 
Justices Alito95 and Thomas96 in Bond, they stress that the President’s treaty 
power must be limited in light of his or her foreign affairs power; likewise, 
Congress’s power to implement treaties (and the President’s power to 
execute them) should be constrained to matters with a nonpretextual link to 
foreign affairs.97 This nexus is established by demonstrating a “benefit to 
concluding an international agreement as opposed to enacting domestic 
legislation.”98 
A reasonableness approach is particularly important for statutory 
implementation of voluntary treaties because by definition, the language of 
such treaties is somewhat vague as to what exactly is demanded of the 
United States.99 This inherent vagueness bears important weight on the self-
executing presumption as applied to voluntary treaties specifically. As a 
threshold matter, voluntary treaties as defined in this Note should be treated 
as presumptively non-self-executing because, regardless of specific 
language in the text of the treaty authorizing the federal government to 
enforce a voluntary treaty, what “enforcement” is remains unclear. 
Consider a hypothetical treaty with the goal of reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions. If the treaty states that its members should “aspire” to reduce 
their “emissions” by “50% in the next fifteen years,” can the United States 
establish a statute cutting federal funding to states that are unable to reduce 
their emissions following these exact parameters? Can the federal 
government impose an intermediate target, such as requiring states to 
reduce their emissions by 25% in the next ten years, by statute? Can the 
EPA enact a regulation that specifically defines “emissions” for purposes 
of calculating reductions to include lead and particulates, but not carbon 
dioxide? This hypothetical illustrates the problem with assuming that a 
voluntary treaty is clear with respect to its obligations. The threshold 
94 Hathaway et al., supra note 1, at 299. 
95 Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2111 (2014) (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). 
96 Id. at 2103 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
97 Hathaway et al., supra note 1, at 303. 
98 Id. at 299.  
99 See supra Section II.B. 
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presumption that voluntary treaties are non-self-executing most reasonably 
reconciles the obligation of the United States to fulfill its duties under 
international agreements with the necessity that abidance with purposely 
indefinite terms must be clarified statutorily.100 
Once Congress codifies a voluntary treaty in an enforcing statute—
required for the treaty’s implementation by the threshold presumption 
prescribed above—a twofold reasonableness inquiry should govern the 
constitutional analysis. First, the statute must be a reasonable interpretation 
of the language and goals of the treaty. Second, the extent of the obligation 
the statute prescribes must be reasonable in light of U.S. involvement in the 
treaty. 
1. Reasonableness in Light of the Language and Goals
of the Treaty.—The first reasonableness analysis, which
considers the language and goals of the treaty, parallels ordinary statutory 
interpretation. However, this Note prescribes a specifically textualist–
originalist approach at this stage unless doing so is impossible.101 A text-
focused analysis is both feasible and advisable in the case of treaty 
interpretation. Treaties typically begin with a preamble specifically stating 
the purposes and goals of the treaty; in light of this deliberate clarity and 
structure, it seems imprudent to impute rationales for the treaty from non-
textual sources.102 Likewise, given the already vague nature of obligations 
under a voluntary treaty, it seems irrational to impute more to the language 
stating member states’ obligations than is already on paper. Exceptions to 
100 See supra notes 37–40 and accompanying text. 
101 Textualist–originalist approaches to constitutional interpretation focus on the explicit language 
of the document, with some looking to the original intent of the Framers or the original public meaning 
of words used in the Framing Era. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, Text vs. Precedent in Constitutional 
Law, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 947, 948–49 (2008) (finding no constitutional support for the 
principle of stare decisis in the text of the Constitution or from Framing Era practice); Michael B. 
Rappaport, The Original Meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1487, 1550–
51 (2005) (interpreting the text and meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause, U.S. CONST. art. II, 
§ 2, cl. 3, using practice from the Framing Era). An analogous approach for treaties would focus only
on the text of the treaty, including the preamble. Critics of textualist–originalist approaches argue that
any interpretation of “original meaning” or “original intent” of constitutional text, and analogously here,
of treaty text, imports not a true “original meaning or intent,” but rather what the reader wants the
original meaning or intent to be. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Matthew B. Arnould, Judicial Review,
Constitutional Interpretation, and the Democratic Dilemma: Proposing a “Controlled Activism”
Alternative, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1485, 1489 (2012) (arguing that “originalist jurists are effectively
empowered to engage in exactly the type of ideologically driven, outcome-determinative analysis that
originalism claims to be designed to prevent”); Jane S. Schacter, Text or Consequences?, 76 BROOK. L.
REV. 1007, 1012–13 (2011) (arguing that judges claiming to apply textualism may be interpreting
constitutional provisions based on their desired consequences, rather than based on the actual text).
102 See, e.g., North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 10, pmbl. (NATO members “are resolved,” among 
other things, “to unite their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and 
security.”); Kyoto Protocol, supra note 13, pmbl. (noting that parties act “[i]n pursuit of the ultimate 
objective of the Convention as stated in its Article 2” (emphasis omitted)). 
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the proposed general rule that interpreting voluntary treaties should begin 
and end with the text of the treaty—most frequently, its preamble—can and 
must be made where the text is ineluctably vague. For example, 
interpreting when U.N. members may authorize the use of armed force 
against another member requires determining when doing so is, per the 
language of the preamble, “in the common interest.”103 A preference for 
textualist–originalist interpretations of a treaty’s purposes and goals where 
possible provides a prudent outer limit to interpreting what is reasonable in 
light of the treaty. 
One might argue that this threshold reasonableness test is too narrow. 
Consequently, courts should defer to Congress’s intent as it might be 
expressed elsewhere: in the implementing statute, in the congressional 
record discussing the potential adoption of the treaty, and so forth. 
However, debates leading up to the adoption of the treaty, where they 
diverge from the actual treaty, are less dispositive than the actual, final 
version of the treaty—and rightly so, given the constitutional posture of 
treaties.104 Indeed, if there is a difference between pre-ratification 
documents and the actual content of the treaty, the final version should 
trump draft discussions and language. Although treaties have changed 
drastically since the Framing Era, the principle of limiting interpretation to 
the four corners of the treaty, where possible, remains just as prudent. 
2. Reasonableness in Light of U.S. Involvement in the
Treaty.—If a statute passes the first reasonableness test, the
next hurdle is that the extent of the obligation the statute prescribes must be 
reasonable in light of U.S. involvement in the treaty. As used here, “extent” 
is a catchall term referring to the scope of the specific statutory 
interpretation of a treaty’s provisions. Extent may refer, for example, to 
whether treaty obligations are enforced in a mandatory or aspirational 
manner, the level of compliance enforced (e.g., the concentration level of 
environmental pollutants deemed legally acceptable), whether penalties for 
domestic violations are criminal or civil, and so forth.105 One inevitably 
cannot conduct this analysis on a purely textualist–originalist basis, since 
the language of the treaty itself combines the input of many countries’ 
representatives without demarcating where U.S. representatives were 
103 U.N. Charter pmbl. (U.N. members aim “to unite [their] strength to maintain international peace 
and security” in part by “ensur[ing] . . . that armed force shall not be used, save in the common 
interest.”). 
104 See supra Section II.A (discussing the Framers’ intent in giving treaties the status of supreme 
law of the land). 
105 See supra Section II.B. 
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involved, at least not explicitly in the treaty.106 Admittedly, then, this 
second reasonableness test is more fact-specific and has the potential to be 
more malleable. However, because the goal of this prong is to identify 
specific U.S. involvement in the treaty, and because the internationally 
cooperative nature of writing the final text of a treaty makes imprudent a 
presumption that the plain text of the treaty alone can shed light on U.S. 
involvement, using a broader test strikes the best balance between the goals 
of the constitutional test set forth herein and the realities of treaty 
interpretation. 
Reasonableness in light of U.S. involvement requires looking into two 
factors, based on the two main reasons why nation-states began entering 
into voluntary treaties in the first place.107 First, is it reasonable given the 
level of commitment to the treaty the United States expressed? This 
requires examining the record of legislative and executive deliberations in 
deciding to ratify the treaty. This record may reveal what priorities the 
Senate considered in ratifying the treaty, how the Senate envisioned the 
United States complying with its aspirational language, what limitations the 
Senate saw to compliance, and so forth—all of which shed light on the 
United States’ intended commitment at the time of the treaty ratification. 
As noted earlier, the President may only enter into treaties with the advice 
and consent of the Senate.108 For this reason, it is likely that a rich record of 
at least the Senate’s deliberations exist for the purpose of this analysis.109  
For older treaties, courts have the benefit of looking additionally to the 
United States’ “course of performance,” in the same way that courts look to 
course of performance to interpret contractual obligations.110 However, 
where the record and course of performance diverge and ample evidence 
for both is available, the record should prevail, because later performance is 
less dispositive regarding what the United States originally intended when 
it entered the treaty. If anything, divergence between the record and course 
106 See, e.g., MALLARD, supra note 7, at 7–9 (discussing this point in the context of the NPT).  
107 See supra Section II.B. 
108 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.  
109 The legislative history of the statutory incorporation of the pre-WTO Uruguay Round 
Agreements provides an illustrative example. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 
108 Stat. 4809 (1994) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 3501–3624 (2012)) [hereinafter URAA]. 
The congressional database suggests that the URAA was referred for discussion to at least eight 
committees in the House of Representatives, two of which wrote official reports. Committees: H.R. 
5110–103rd Congress (1993–1994), CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/103rd-
congress/house-bill/5110/committees?q=%7B”search”%3A%5B”Pub.+L.+103-465”%5D%7D 
[https://perma.cc/U6PU-6H6B]. This does not even include potential floor discussions in the House, nor 
does it include potential committee and floor discussions in the Senate.  
110 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-208 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2007); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202(4) (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
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of performance should indicate that the United States is currently straying 
from what it originally agreed to—a violation of its original intent in 
entering the treaty, not a meaningful illustration thereof.111 Ultimately, 
“level of commitment” is an intent-based test assessed at the time the treaty 
was entered into. Hence, the ratification-period record should take 
precedence over later actions in interpreting the level of commitment. 
Second, is the statute reasonable given the ability or willingness of the 
United States to comply? Voluntary treaty obligations are typically entered 
into to manage the inability or unwillingness of potential signatories to 
meet stiffer standards, so this is a prudent factor to consider.112 As with the 
first factor, courts may look to the record to assess this factor, though the 
analysis is more complex. The United States’ ability or willingness to 
comply may have changed since the inception of the treaty, and treaties 
with voluntary or sliding-scale obligations usually ratchet up obligations 
accordingly through a tier-based classification system.113 Hence, under this 
factor, ability or willingness at the inception of the treaty does not trump 
ability or willingness at the time the enacting statute became law (or even 
at the time the case is before the court). If treaty obligations do change 
based on ability or willingness over time, it seems prudent to give 
precedence to more recent ability or willingness in analyzing this factor, 
not to ability or willingness at the inception of the treaty—as long as the 
extent of the obligation enshrined in Congress’s implementing statute is 
within the range of compliance the United States acceded to by ratifying 
the treaty in the first place.114 
One possible critique of the commitment and ability–willingness 
factors under the second reasonableness test is that prior U.S. commitment 
might very well conflict with current ability or willingness to comply. 
Indeed, divergence between the two could signify the United States’ 
backsliding on its treaty obligations. However, a statistical analogy 
111 Of course, divergence between course of performance and original intent at ratification may 
indicate a desire to abrogate one’s treaty obligations altogether—that is, to abandon the treaty. This 
Note presumes that the United States has not expressly rejected, nor evinced an intent to leave, a treaty 
whose implementation by statute is under consideration. 
112 See supra notes 37–40 and accompanying text. 
113 See, e.g., Kyoto Protocol, supra note 13, art. 10 (describing the differing obligations between 
developed member states in the Protocol’s Annex I and developing states not in Annex I). Compare 
NPT, supra note 7, art. I (describing the obligations of “nuclear-weapon State Part[ies]” neither to 
transfer nuclear weapons to any recipient nor to induce any country to seek nuclear weapons), with id. 
art. II (describing the obligations of “non-nuclear-weapon State Part[ies]” not to receive nuclear 
weapons in the future). 
114 Of course, if the treaty-executing statute does not fall in the range of compliance the United 
States accepted under the final version of the treaty, then the statute plainly runs afoul of the treaty and 
is by definition not within Congress’s treaty-executing power. 
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illuminates why these two factors complement, rather than contradict, each 
other. As mentioned above, when the United States agrees to a voluntary 
treaty, it agrees to a range of possibly acceptable obligations.115 Hence, the 
intent-based commitment test is best viewed as a means to determine a 
“confidence interval” within which the United States can choose a variety 
of policy outcomes and still technically be in compliance with the treaty.116 
The ability–willingness factor, then, specifically places current U.S. 
compliance along that axis of permissible policy outcomes. First, if the 
current state of treaty compliance is within the commitment test’s 
confidence interval, then the United States is formally compliant with the 
treaty. If it does not fall in that range, the United States is formally 
violating its obligations. Second, the ability–willingness factor allows the 
United States to reasonably craft its method for complying with treaties 
based on its current limitations. After all, the whole point of a voluntary 
treaty is providing allowance for different levels of compliance, so long as 
they are within the acceptable range stipulated by the treaty.117 
The constitutional test proposed for voluntary treaties in this Note is 
admittedly complex, but necessarily so. The presumption of non-self-
execution acknowledges the paradoxically explicit vagueness of voluntary 
treaties, while the two-step reasonableness analysis provides a boundary for 
statutory implementation where the text of the treaty is insufficiently 
specific. This analysis best balances the international and domestic 
concerns that abound in such treaties. 
B. Not Treaties, But Made Pursuant Thereto: Incorporating
Post-Treaty Pronouncements 
Once a treaty capable of generating post-treaty pronouncements is 
properly ratified and executed domestically, courts must grapple with 
115 See supra notes 99–100 and accompanying text. 
116 The “confidence interval” is a critical concept in statistics. A classical statistical conundrum is 
that one who wishes to study a particular variable or parameter in a population can only study a sample 
of the population. For example, while data obtained from a sample can identify the mean value—one 
paradigmatic parameter statisticians measure—in that sample, that data cannot conclusively identify the 
true mean in the entire population. A statistician can therefore only estimate the true value of that 
parameter, and he or she must thus indicate the extent to which he or she is certain that this estimated 
value is the parameter’s true value. The confidence interval is calculated based on sample data to 
estimate a range within which a statistician can be somewhat sure the true parameter value for the entire 
population is, and the degree of confidence is denoted by a probability between zero and one. For 
example, based on sample observations and a calculated sample mean, a statistician can be 95% sure 
that the true mean value for the population is within the estimated 95% confidence interval range. The 
classical article that introduced this now-omnipresent statistical concept is J. Neyman, Outline of a 
Theory of Statistical Estimation Based on the Classical Theory of Probability, 236 PHIL. 
TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL SOC’Y OF LONDON SERIES A 333 (1937). 
117 See supra notes 33–41 and accompanying text. 
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incorporating the pronouncements that follow. At the onset, there is one 
area in which post-treaty pronouncements must be treated equivalently with 
originating treaties: both pronouncements and the treaties giving rise to 
them may not violate the Constitution.118 However, post-treaty 
pronouncements should not be treated exactly like treaties themselves, 
because they do not undergo the constitutional procedural requirements for 
treaties.119 As a consequence, incorporating post-treaty pronouncements 
requires interpreting documents—the treaty and the Constitution—and then 
fitting the pronouncement into the structure of federal law if it passes those 
interpretive inquiries. A proper constitutional test for post-treaty 
pronouncements must address both tasks in order to provide a sufficiently 
comprehensive approach. 
1. Threshold Inquiry: Does the Pronouncement Violate a
Constitutional Provision?—The threshold interpretation test
involves a twofold constitutional inquiry. First, courts must examine 
whether the pronouncement—not just the treaty that originated it—violates 
some provision of the Constitution.120 Like the original treaty itself, no 
post-treaty pronouncement should be incorporated if doing so would 
violate parts of the Constitution. A specific pronouncement could be 
entirely valid within the procedures prescribed by its originating treaty—
and its originating treaty may be constitutional—yet the pronouncement 
itself could theoretically fail a constitutionality test.121 This first inquiry 
precludes the incorporation of such a pronouncement. 
118 Hathaway et al., supra note 1, at 266 (“Constitutional text and doctrine pose a set of affirmative 
constitutional commands that necessarily limit the exercise of power by the federal government. Such 
affirmative guarantees are set forth explicitly in the Bill of Rights’ recognition and guarantee of 
individual rights and in the Constitution’s provisions prescribing the structure of the national 
government.”); Leonie W. Huang, Note, Which Treaties Reign Supreme? The Dormant Supremacy 
Clause Effect of Implemented Non-Self-Executing Treaties, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2211, 2226 (2011) 
(“Today it is well settled that all treaties are subject to the Constitution.” (citing Reid v. Covert, 
354 U.S. 1, 16–18 (1957))). 
119 See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
120 Cf., e.g., Reid, 354 U.S. at 19 (finding unconstitutional a treaty, not a post-treaty 
pronouncement, in violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 
429–30, 435 (1920) (noting that a treaty would be unconstitutional if it impermissibly infringed on 
states’ rights under the Tenth Amendment, but finding the treaty in question constitutional because no 
such violation was present). 
121 Hypothetically, for example, the U.N. Economic and Social Council, whose areas of concern 
include environmental protection, could recommend to the General Assembly a resolution that purports 
to grant protected status to an endangered species which exists in the United States as a wholly 
intrastate, noncommercial species. Under current commerce clause doctrine, such a resolution would be 
unconstitutional if adopted by the U.S. Senate because it reaches purely intrastate commerce, Gibbons 
v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 195 (1824), and bears no substantial relation to interstate commerce, United States
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995). If the federal government’s imposition of this restriction would
violate states’ reserved powers under the Tenth Amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. X, and exceed its
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2. Procedural and Substantive Compliance with the
Originating Treaty.—Second, courts should examine whether the
post-treaty pronouncement is valid under the treaty itself. This inquiry 
involves determining whether the pronouncement meets procedural 
requirements of the treaty122 and aligns with the substantive law governing 
the pronouncement. Both procedural adequacy and substantive adequacy 
are, in effect, reasonableness tests. In order to determine if a 
pronouncement is reasonable within the scope of its originating treaty, 
courts must look both to the text of the treaties that a pronouncement 
claims to interpret and to the relevant existing elaboration—case law, 
resolutions, “legislative history,” and so on—that may bear on the 
procedural and substantive elements of the treaty. Even if a post-treaty 
pronouncement is constitutional on its own, it cannot be incorporated into 
U.S. law if it nonetheless substantively or procedurally violates the treaty 
that gave rise to it in the first place. 
The analysis is thus similar to courts’ assessment of whether an 
agency’s regulation is a valid interpretation of a federal statute,123 or 
whether an act of Congress is properly based in one of Congress’s 
constitutional powers.124 In reviewing whether regulations are valid 
interpretations, courts assess whether the statute is one that the agency 
“administers”125 and whether the statute is ambiguous or silent on the point 
to which the regulation refers.126 If both those prerequisites are met, courts 
assess whether the regulation is a reasonable interpretation of the statute, 
own enumerated powers, id. art. I, § 8, a foreign body to which the United States is party via a treaty 
likely cannot pass such a resolution. 
122 See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. 5, 11, opened for signature July 
17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome Statute] (defining the 
crimes that may be litigated at the International Criminal Court and the temporal jurisdiction of the 
court); RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, at 34–36, U.N. Doc. A/520/Rev.17, U.N. 
Sales No. E.08.I.9 (2007) (describing the voting rules for resolutions at the U.N. General Assembly). 
123 E.g., Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
124 E.g., Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (addressing whether the Affordable Care Act is a valid 
exercise of Congress’s powers under the Taxing and Spending, Commerce, and Necessary and Proper 
Clauses). 
125 Whether an agency “administers” a statute turns on whether the agency has exclusive authority 
to enforce it or whether it shares that authority with other agencies. For example, in Rapaport v. U.S. 
Dep’t of the Treasury, Office of Thrift Supervision, 59 F.3d 212 (D.C. Cir. 1995), the D.C. Circuit held 
that the Office of Thrift Supervision did not deserve Chevron deference because it shared authority to 
administer the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101–
73 § 401(a), 103 Stat. 183 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.), with two other 
agencies. Rapaport, 59 F.3d at 216–17 (“[W]e owe no such deference to the OTS’s interpretation of 
§ 1818 because that agency shares responsibility for the administration of the statute with at least three
other agencies. The alternative would lay the groundwork for a regulatory regime in which either the
same statute is interpreted differently by the several agencies or the one agency that happens to reach
the courthouse first is allowed to fix the meaning of the text for all.” (internal citations omitted)). 
126 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. 
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and if so, courts accord agency interpretations maximal deference.127 
Likewise, in reviewing whether statutes are valid exercises of constitutional 
congressional power, courts look to whether one or more grants of power to 
Congress authorize the specific statute in question. If an act of Congress 
does not derive from one of those grants, the statute is unconstitutional.128 
The analytical process courts would have to undergo to assess the validity 
of post-treaty pronouncements, therefore, is hardly novel in comparison to 
their typical domestic law work. 
Admittedly, treaty interpretation may be a somewhat complex inquiry, 
since courts must interpret substantive and procedural law from non-U.S. 
jurisdictions. However, two points regarding courts’ existing tasks make 
courts’ interpretive analyses for treaties less worrisome. First, courts 
already interpret law from other jurisdictions, including the various 
states,129 and occasionally even the laws of other countries and international 
organizations.130 It is true that the interpretation this test requires of courts 
may be more extensive than the analytical depth of treaties most U.S. 
courts are used to. However, courts already conduct similar analyses on 
domestic legal documents such as regulations and the Constitution.131 Thus, 
even if courts were conducting more extensive inquiries into international 
law documents than before, it is sufficiently similar to other interpretive 
tasks they typically do in the domestic arena. Courts have the tools for 
analyzing international organizations’ law and can build up this expertise 
over time. Second, international bodies issuing post-treaty pronouncements 
tend to have structures, procedures, and outcomes familiar to federal courts. 
For example, the U.N. General Assembly and the WTO’s main body both 
operate similarly to U.S. federal and state legislatures.132 Likewise, 
127 Id. at 844. 
128 Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2577. 
129 For example, courts consider whether state laws are procedural or substantive in conducting 
analyses under the Erie doctrine, and as a result may apply state rather than federal substantive law. See 
generally RICHARD L. MARCUS, MARTIN H. REDISH, EDWARD F. SHERMAN & JAMES E. PFANDER, 
CIVIL PROCEDURE: A MODERN APPROACH 1013–110 (6th ed. 2013) (discussing choice of law in 
diversity suits at federal courts and the Erie doctrine). 
130 For example, where courts are asked to dismiss cases to foreign courts under the forum non 
conveniens doctrine, they may occasionally consider whether the law of a foreign jurisdiction is 
sufficient to promote the interests of justice, the parties, and the courts themselves. See, e.g., Piper 
Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254–55 (1981) (noting that inadequacy of legal remedies in a 
foreign jurisdiction would justify not removing a case to it under the forum non conveniens doctrine, 
but finding adequate legal remedies available to the plaintiff-respondent in the alternative forum). 
131 See supra notes 123–28 and accompanying text. 
132 RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, at 34–36, U.N. Doc. A/520/Rev.17, U.N. 
Sales No. E.08.I.9 (2007) (describing voting rules for U.N. General Assembly resolutions); DSB, Rules 
of Procedure for Sessions of the Ministerial Conference and Meetings of the General Council, at 11, 
WTO Doc. WT/L/161 (July 25, 1996) (describing voting rules in the WTO General Council). 
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international courts use common law reasoning similar to that used by U.S. 
courts.133 Finally, international organizations that perform legislative or 
judicial functions amass helpful guidance U.S. courts may use to aid their 
interpretive tasks: legislative histories, case law, and so forth. Thus, the 
threshold interpretation inquiry is more manageable than it may appear at 
first. 
3. The Issue of Precedence for Constitutional Post-Treaty
Pronouncements.—If a post-treaty pronouncement survives the
two-step constitutional inquiry above, this Note argues that it should be 
incorporated into federal law, but not at a level equivalent to the treaty as 
the supreme law of the land. Rather, it should be incorporated with the 
same level of precedence as a federal substantive (i.e., not procedural) 
statute.134 This argument parallels Professor Bradley’s claim that treaties 
themselves should be on parity with federal statutes.135 While Professor 
Bradley’s argument as applied to treaties themselves is specious based on 
the very text of the Constitution,136 applying his proposed level of 
precedence to post-treaty pronouncements creates a desirable balance 
between the interests of the international treaty regime and the 
constitutional interests of the national government and of state 
governments. Incorporating the post-treaty pronouncement fulfills the 
purposes of the treaty, because not doing so is effectively equivalent to 
refusing to follow a procedurally and substantively valid extrapolation of 
the original treaty. 
Moreover, incorporating the pronouncement at the specific level of a 
federal statute matches constitutional logic based on the nature of federal 
statutes and of post-treaty pronouncements. Post-treaty pronouncements 
may take the form of rules, akin to legislative statutes,137 or adjudications, 
akin to court cases.138 Rule-type pronouncements are functionally 
analogous to federal statutes implementing non-self-executing treaties—
voluntary or otherwise—because they interpret the meaning of the treaty’s 
provisions and surrounding laws.139 Federal statutes likewise draw on the 
133 See, e.g., Harlan Grant Cohen, International Law’s Erie Moment, 34 MICH. J. INT’L LAW 249, 
280 (2013) (noting examples of cases in which international courts have used common law reasoning). 
134 Recall that the interpretation inquiry already requires the post-treaty pronouncement not to 
violate any provision of the Constitution. See supra Section III.B.1. 
135 Bradley, supra note 81, at 456. 
136 See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
137 E.g., supra note 8. 
138 E.g., supra note 9. 
139 E.g., S.C. Res. 678, pmbl. (Nov. 29, 1990) (noting that the U.N. Security Council was acting 
pursuant to Article VII of the U.N. Charter in authorizing, through this resolution, collective military 
action against Iraq at the beginning of the Persian Gulf War); Case Concerning Avena and Other 
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authority allocated to Congress through its enumerated powers in the 
Constitution.140 It is therefore constitutionally logical to apply the same 
level of precedence to treaty-interpreting rules as is applied against 
Constitution-interpreting federal statutes.141 
Adjudication-type pronouncements pose a more complicated 
conundrum, but one that is nonetheless best resolved by granting the same 
level of precedence as is proposed for rule-type pronouncements. They are 
analogous to case law interpreting the Constitution; they interpret treaties, 
which are also “the supreme Law of the Land,” in specific factual 
scenarios, but they are not the “treaties” themselves.142 Likewise, Supreme 
Court constitutional case law precludes contrary statutes, but is not “the 
Constitution” itself. In a similar way to constitutional case law, then, 
adjudication-type pronouncements interpreting a treaty ought to take lower 
precedence than the treaty (or the Constitution). However, the Supreme 
Court has held that constitutional case law supersedes statutory 
interpretation of the Constitution, suggesting that, at least in constitutional 
law matters, case law has higher precedence than federal statutes.143 These 
opposing approaches suggest alternatively that pronouncements based on 
treaties should receive treaty-level or below-treaty-level (i.e., federal statute 
level) precedence. 
There is reason to resolve this conflicted position for adjudication-type 
pronouncements by granting them federal statutory precedence, lower than 
constitutional case law. Although the Constitution and treaties are both the 
supreme law of the land, the Constitution takes precedence over treaties.144 
Thus, generally speaking, interpretations of treaties should take lower 
constitutional precedence than interpretations of the Constitution. 
Moreover, adjudication-type pronouncements pose a much greater anti-
democratic danger than constitutional case law, because they are frequently 
enacted by agents not beholden to the people of the United States through 
Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), Judgment, 2004 I.C.J. 12, ¶ 63 (Mar. 31) (interpreting Article 36 of 
the Vienna Convention, supra note 73). 
140 Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577 (2012). 
141 Functional analogousness of statutes and rule-type pronouncements aside, one may counter that, 
unlike members of Congress, who are held accountable to the people of the United States by electoral 
processes, the persons in charge of making post-treaty pronouncements are not held accountable to the 
people of the United States by any analogous mechanism. See supra Section I.C. However, this concern 
bears more directly on substantive and procedural limitations on the treaty-making power, which is 
beyond the scope of this Note. As acknowledged at the introduction to this Section, this Note presumes 
that the originating treaty itself and all bodies and mechanisms created directly under its provisions are 
constitutional. 
142 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
143 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 529 (1997). 
144 See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
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either appointment or election.145 The balance struck here best reconciles 
concerns raised in the preceding paragraph. 
A second reason that federal statute precedence is appropriate for rule- 
or adjudication-type post-treaty pronouncements is that the Constitution 
places the foreign affairs power in the federal government and not in the 
states.146 Post-treaty pronouncements, which interpret treaties entered into 
under the foreign affairs power, should take higher precedence over state 
laws in the legal hierarchy. In light of (1) the foreign affairs nature of 
treaties, (2) concerns over both the higher position of the Constitution over 
treaties and, (3) the nature of post-treaty pronouncements as not being 
equivalent to the treaty itself, the best precedential position is that of 
federal statutes. 
Finally, while granting pronouncements a status equivalent to federal 
statutes rightly establishes a presumption that they preempt state law,147 
states still have room to challenge them on the grounds that they interfere 
impermissibly with states’ constitutional rights.148 Where treaties are 
ambiguous as to their specific obligations or are open to further 
interpretation through post-treaty pronouncements, post-treaty 
pronouncements will likely elaborate on the meaning of the treaty long 
after the treaty was first entered into. In light of that reality, post-treaty 
pronouncements will likely be more common and more important sources 
of domestic obligations under the treaty than the originating treaties 
themselves. Allowing states to challenge the validity of pronouncements 
will become ever more essential to maintaining the proper balance of 
power between states, the federal government, and international 
145 See supra notes 8–11 and accompanying text. 
146 The Constitution affirmatively grants the treaty-making power to the President, with the advice 
and consent of the Senate, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2, and grants power to Congress to make laws as 
are “necessary and proper for carrying into Execution . . . Powers vested by this Constitution in the 
Government of the United States.” Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. It also explicitly bars states from “enter[ing] 
into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation,” thus removing the treaty power for states, and by 
negation, placing it in the federal government. Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
147 Cf. Hillman v. Maretta, 133 S. Ct. 1943, 1955 (2013) (holding that provisions in the Federal 
Employees’ Group Life Insurance Act of 1954 preempted a state law); Arizona v. United States, 132 S. 
Ct. 2492, 2505 (2012) (holding that federal immigration law preempted a state law); Ridgway v. 
Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46, 56–57 (1981) (holding that provisions in the Servicemen’s Group Life Insurance 
Act preempted a state court’s conflicting decree). 
148 See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 907–08 (1997) (invalidating provisions of the 
Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act which unconstitutionally commandeered state executive 
agents in violation of states’ rights under the Tenth Amendment); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 
517 U.S. 44, 72–73 (1996) (holding that the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act could not allow tribes to 
bring states before federal court, because doing so violated state sovereign immunity under the Eleventh 
Amendment); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175–76 (1992) (invalidating the take title 
provision of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act as a violation of the Tenth 
Amendment due to unconstitutional commandeering of state legislatures). 
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organizations. In light of Supreme Court case law authorizing states to 
challenge federal statutes where they infringe on states’ constitutionally 
protected powers,149 treating valid pronouncements as akin to federal 
statutes best satisfies the constitutional balance between states and the 
federal government. 
As with voluntary treaties, courts need to grapple with a more 
complex constitutional framework when addressing and incorporating post-
treaty pronouncements. The threshold interpretation inquiry is complicated, 
but analogous to reasonableness inquiries into statutes, regulations, and 
common law rules that courts typically undertake. While there are certainly 
potential issues regarding whether the proposed analysis is prudent or 
possible, this Note has shown that any such problems can be resolved with 
reference to other types of domestic law cases courts ordinarily take. The 
issue of what precedence post-treaty pronouncements would take, if valid, 
adds a layer of controversy. This Note provides a solution based on the 
structure and internal logic of the Constitution that best resolves competing 
international, federal, and state interests. 
CONCLUSION 
To stay relevant, constitutional theories regarding treaty making and 
treaty execution must engage with changes in the international treaty 
regime. This Note identifies two evolutions—voluntary treaties and post-
treaty pronouncements—that neither case law nor academic research to 
date has adequately addressed. Both evolutions involve an intricate balance 
of interests between the international community, the federal government, 
and the state governments. Because both voluntary treaties and post-treaty 
pronouncements are likely to grow ever more frequent and complicated in 
the future, scholars and judges alike must reconcile those complexities with 
the logic of federal law and the Constitution. 
The constitutional tests proposed are rooted in policy concerns as well 
as in the text, structure, and logic of the Constitution. Voluntary treaties 
raise the issue of what constitutes valid interpretation given their 
ambiguous obligations. It is therefore prudent to begin with a presumption 
that such treaties are non-self-executing, and then require implementing 
statutes to surpass a twofold reasonableness inquiry based on the treaty 
itself as well as U.S. interests in entering into it. And because post-treaty 
pronouncements are made in pursuance of a treaty, but are not the treaty 
itself, this Note begins with an interpretive reasonableness inquiry in light 
of the Constitution and the treaty organization’s body of law. This Note 
149 See supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
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then incorporates a pronouncement that survives that threshold inquiry at 
the level of federal substantive law. 
Because treaties raise unique concerns unlike those that arise when 
interpreting statutes, regulations, or the Constitution, this Note proposes 
multistep reasonableness tests in order to allay concerns that a simpler 
rational basis test would be too lenient.150 Using an approach that applies 
constitutional principles in light of the special needs and circumstances that 
emerge from voluntary treaties and post-treaty pronouncements, this Note 
provides a vital methodology to navigate an increasingly complicated 
international, legal, and constitutional order. 
150 See, e.g., Virginia H. Johnson, Note, Application of the Rational Basis Test to Treaty-
Implementing Legislation: The Need for a More Stringent Standard of Review, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 
347, 392 (2001). 
